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Introduction 
In the current health reform discussions, 
accountable care organizations (ACOs) 
have been proposed as a novel way 
to slow rising health care costs and 
to improve quality in the traditional 
Medicare program and perhaps other 
public and private insurance programs. 
However, for many, it is not clear what 
ACOs are and whether and how they 
differ from other past reform approaches 
intended to achieve the same goals. 
The ACO concept is confusing partly 
because it is a concept with a history, 
one that is rapidly evolving and for 
which the terminology seems to keep 
changing. In fact, as the Issue Brief will 
show, different reform ideas have now 
been joined under the rubric of ACO. 
The primary purposes of this Issue Brief 
are to provide insight into what ACOs 
seem to represent and whether they 
potentially offer a new and improved 
way to reform U.S. provider payment 
and delivery systems, with an emphasis 
on their application in Medicare. 
First, we clarify what ACOs generally 
are, including the current concept’s 
genesis and important dimensions on 
which ACOs might vary. Second, we 
discuss what is new about the current 
ACO concept compared to previous 
reform concepts, such as “accountable 
health plans” or Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) and provider-
sponsored organizations (PSOs) that 
were established for Medicare in the 
Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA)  
of 1997. 
Third, we identify key ACO program 
features and issues policymakers 
are grappling with and about which 
there are different and even divergent 
viewpoints. These include: (1) the 
ACO definition and qualifying criteria, 
such as what kinds of providers must 
be included and whether an ACO 
is different from a patient-centered 
medical home (PCMH); (2) whether an 
ACO program should be voluntary or 
mandatory for providers; (3) similarly, 
whether beneficiaries should be 
assigned to ACOs or should elect to 
participate in one; (4) alternative ACO 
payment methods and their respective 
strengths and weaknesses; and, (5) 
quality measurement and monitoring. 
Decisions about these program features 
and issues will strongly influence 
providers and patients’ reactions to the 
ACO concept. 
Finally, we discuss several major 
implementation challenges, specifically, 
participation of and possible untoward 
impact on other payers and the new 
roles, responsibilities, and capabilities 
for providers and government. We 
also summarize some of the pointed 
skepticism that some have leveled at 
the ACO concept and consider whether 
this is another example of a concept 
advanced more by wishful thinking than 
by empirically based policy analysis. 
We conclude that ACOs are no game 
changer in the short run because they 
require resolution of some challenging 
and complex issues as well as significant 
provider and policymaker learning, but 
nonetheless, they are important to try. 
If done well, an ACO program could 
build on lessons learned from and since 
the managed care era of the 1990s, get 
critical provider payments and delivery 
system changes underway, and perhaps 
in the long run move us beyond reliance 
on what many consider a dysfunctional 
fee-for-service (FFS) payment system. 
What is an ACO?
Fundamentally, the ACO concept 
couples provider payment and delivery 
system reforms in an attempt to solve 
the “chicken and egg” problem.1 
Many believe that to bend the cost 
curve while improving quality, we 
must reform the provider payment 
system first, because it pays for volume 
rather than value. Others hold that it 
is impossible to change the payment 
system to achieve the desired objectives 
unless delivery system reform first 
produces organizations capable of 
handling an altered payment system. 
They point to the need for health care 
professionals, now usually working in 
separate institutional settings, to work 
collaboratively and to demonstrate their 
capacity for handling new payment 
approaches. To avoid the quandary of 
where to start first—provider payment 
or delivery system reform—the ACO 
concept attempts to combine them.
More specifically, ACOs can generally 
be defined as a local entity and a related 
set of providers, including at least 
primary care physicians, specialists, and 
hospitals, that can be held accountable 
for the cost and quality of care delivered 
to a defined subset of traditional 
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Medicare program beneficiaries or 
other defined populations, such as 
commercial health plan subscribers.2 
The primary ways the entity would be 
held accountable for its performance are 
through changes in traditional Medicare 
provider payment featuring financial 
rewards for good performance based 
on comprehensive quality and spending 
measurement and monitoring. Public 
reporting of cost and quality information 
to affect public perception of an ACO’s 
worth is another way of holding the 
ACO accountable for its performance.
Proponents generally view three ACO 
characteristics as essential. These 
characteristics include: (1) the ability 
to provide, and manage with patients, 
the continuum of care across different 
institutional settings, including at least 
ambulatory and inpatient hospital 
care and possibly post acute care; 
(2) the capability of prospectively 
planning budgets and resource needs; 
and, (3) sufficient size to support 
comprehensive, valid, and reliable 
performance measurement.3 Table 1 
summarizes the diverse entities that 
could serve as an ACO, solely or in 
combination, including their capacity  
on the first two criteria. 
Diverse entities could serve as an ACO, 
alone or in combination with each 
other, the collective serving as a local 
provider umbrella organization, system, 
or network (see figure 1). Shortell and 
Casalino4 identify five different types of 
existing organizations that could either 
exclusively serve as an ACO in a local 
geographic area, or more likely lead 
or be part of an ACO led by another 
provider organization in the area. These 
existing provider organizations include 
(1) various types of physician groups 
or physician-centered organizations, 
namely multispecialty group practices 
(MSGs) and interdependent physician 
organizations (IPOs)—what most 
people refer to as an independent 
practice association (IPA); (2) hospital-
centered organizations, namely hospital 
medical staff organizations (MSOs) 
and physician-hospital organizations 
(PHOs); and (3) Health Plan-Provider 
Organization or Networks (HPPNs). 
The latter is similar to a particular 
type of HMO, specifically one that 
contracts with one or more IPAs or 
with independent physician practices. 
However, rather than discussing HPPNs 
which can already participate in 
Medicare as a Medicare Advantage (PA) 
plan, we discuss organized or integrated 
delivery systems (ODSs or IDSs) more 
narrowly.5 
Fisher and his team6 also acknowledge 
that this range of existing provider 
organizations could surely serve as 
ACOs, but they also introduce the 
idea that a new type of organization,7 
fostered by analysis of Medicare claims 
data and comprised of local hospitals 
and the physicians who work in and 
around them, could also form ACOs.  
It is this “virtual” organization concept 
that spurred the recent ACO interest 
based on the view that these less 
formal organizations could develop 
relatively quickly and throughout the 
heterogeneous forms of U.S. health  
care delivery. 
Together, the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the 
organization that advises Congress 
on payment and related policies for 
Medicare, and Fisher provided the 
impetus for the current concept and 
interest in ACOs, building on two 
developments—an early, positive 
evaluation of the Medicare Physician 
Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration 
that relied on an FFS-based payment 
model8 and analysis by Fisher that 
patients cared for by particular 
physician groups flowed to or clustered 
at particular hospitals.9 The latter 
analysis suggested to some that a virtual, 
extended hospital medical staff could 
be held accountable for total spending 
and the quality of care for patients 
who obtain their care from this set of 
physicians, similar to the way that the 
MSGs in the PGP demonstration were 
being held accountable in determining 
their eligibility for financial bonuses  
for performance.10 
Others have followed with their own 
versions of ACOs, sometimes using 
different terminology and offering 
somewhat different prescriptions for 
their design features. For example, 
in the House of Representatives 
Table 1.  Potential ACO Models and Their Characteristics
Provider Type
Ability to Provide or Manage 
Care Across Continuum
Ability to Plan Budgets and 
Resource Needs (Accept and 
manage non-FFS payment) 
Provider Inclusiveness 
Level of Performance 
Accountability
IPA Low/Medium Medium High Medium
Multispecialty Group Medium/High Medium Low/Medium Medium/High
Hospital Medical Staff  
Organization
Medium Low/Medium Medium Low/Medium
Physician-Hospital  
Organization (PHO)
Medium/High Medium/High Low/Medium Medium/High
Organized or Integrated  
Delivery Systems
Medium/High Medium/High Medium Medium/ High
Virtual approach-Extended 
Hospital Medical Staff
Medium Low/Medium High Low
*Based on the literature about these types of organizations. 
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Tri-Committee on Health Reform 
draft legislation that set up ACO 
demonstrations,11 the definition of an 
ACO is quite broad, and the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human 
Services would delineate a more specific 
definition and qualifying criteria when 
proceeding to solicit demonstration 
participants. Qualifying criteria would 
have to delineate, for example, what 
legal structure would be acceptable 
for permitting the ACO entity and its 
constituent providers to receive and 
distribute payments and the minimum 
number and types of physicians 
needed in an ACO. The Senate Finance 
Committee Chairman’s Mark also 
uses a quite broad ACO definition, but 
articulates more specific qualifying 
criteria, leaving less discretion 
for the Secretary in designing the 
demonstrations.12 
What is new about the ACO 
concept and proposals?
While the notion of accountability is 
not new, the locus of accountability 
has changed. “Accountability” became 
a key word and critical part of the 
managed competition approach adopted 
in President Clinton’s Health Security 
Act, in which health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) were dubbed 
“accountable health plans.”13 Developers 
of the ACO concept also emphasize 
accountability, but focus directly on 
health care providers and the delivery 
system instead of insurers and HMOs. 
The focus on local providers and 
delivery systems stems from a desire 
to address a number of continuing, 
frequent problems, including absence  
of financial incentives to reduce cost  
and improve quality and resultant 
problems, such as uncoordinated care 
and unwarranted geographic variation  
in practice patterns and health spending. 
The new approach, then, emphasizes 
accountability at the level of actual  
care delivery. 
Second, the ACO concept envisions 
direct contracting with provider 
organizations without the reliance 
on a health plan intermediary and 
thus is distinct and separate from the 
contracting that occurs in the Medicare 
Advantage program, which presumably 
would continue in parallel. Actually, in 
the BBA of 1997, PSOs were created to 
facilitate Medicare engaging in financial 
risk contracting directly with provider 
organizations. However, only a few 
PSOs have developed and participated 
in the program in the decade that this 
option has been available. As discussed 
later, current ACO proposals do not 
envision the degree of provider risk 
assumption that subjected PSOs to state 
insurance regulation or the BBA-enabled 
alternative. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that some ACO proposals would involve 
providers taking financial risk, thereby 
raising concerns about solvency, and 
would employ even mild limitations  
or incentives to channel beneficiaries  
to ACO providers, the program might 
again have to address complex insurance 
regulation issues that affected the  
PSO effort.14 
Third, the ACO concept and current 
proposals potentially allow great 
flexibility in both the types of 
organizations that would qualify to 
serve as an ACO and the available 
provider payment methods. Some 
think this degree of flexibility differs 
from previous reform approaches 
that emphasized particular types of 
insurance or provider organization—
HMOs or IDSs—or one approach to 
provider payment—full capitation, as 
in the PSO program. The degree of 
flexibility in the ACO concept and in 
some proposals is recognition of the 
substantial variation in local health 
care markets, as well as in provider 
organizations and their willingness 
and ability to accept nonstandard, 
FFS payments. The increased 
flexibility presumably would provide 
opportunities for virtually all physicians 
and hospitals to participate and would 
“let the market work,” in the sense that 
local market conditions and dynamics 
would ultimately determine which ACO 
organizational model and supportive 
payment approach prevailed in any 
particular area. 
Figure 1.  Possible ACO Configurations, Comprised of Different Provider 
Organizations in Local and Regional Geographic Areas
Tertiary or Quaternary Care Facility 
and Associated Specialty Physicians*
ACO Model 1 ACO Model 2 ACO Model 3 ACO Model 4
Independent  
Practice Association 
(IPA)  
or 
Primary Care  
Physician Groups
Specialty Groups
Multispecialty  
Group
Hospital
Hospital
Hospital Medical  
Staff Organization 
(MSO)  
or 
Physician-Hospital 
Organization (PHO)
Organized  
Delivery System
*Hospital
*Employed 
and Affiliated 
Physicians
*Possibly Other 
Providers, like 
Post-Acute Care
*Most care provided by single ACO, but some care will be delivered by other ACOs or regional referral centers like tertiary  
or quaternary hospitals and their associated specialists, unless a strict beneficiary lock-in is utilized.
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Key ACO program features
Although various authors and legislative 
proposals have described the broad 
outlines of the ACO concept,15 there 
are many program options and design 
features that are being actively discussed 
and debated. Decisions about these 
ACO program options and features 
would substantially affect the nature 
and contours of the ACO program; its 
implementation, including its scale, 
pace, challenges, and potentially 
necessary supports; and short and long-
term outcomes with respect to cost 
reduction and quality improvement. 
Here we discuss five key issues to watch 
as ACO program proposals unfold. 
Specific ACO definition and 
qualifying criteria 
Legislative proposals in the House and 
Senate16 both define ACOs quite broadly, 
but seem to leave important aspects  
of the ACO concept somewhat unclear 
or reflect different perspectives on  
some key issues, including how much  
of the decisions should be left  
to the Secretary of HHS. Program 
design decision issues include which 
type of provider organization can lead 
an ACO, in particular whether it must 
be physician led; what other types of 
provider organizations may or must  
be included; what specific ACO 
qualifying criteria should govern 
participation; and whether PCMHs  
can lead or be part of an ACO. 
Some believe that physician-centered 
organizations should lead ACOs because 
the resources that flow from the 
decisions physicians make with patients 
account for a major portion of overall 
health care costs, regardless of where 
the care actually takes place. Most 
existing physician practices, which are 
solo or small, single specialty groups 
would not possess the three essential 
ACO characteristics described above.17 
MedPAC and others have suggested 
that IPAs are an organizational model 
that would permit even small physician 
practices to come together to form 
organizations fulfilling these criteria. 
Some hold that if a MSG- or IPA-based 
ACO did not include a hospital, these 
physician-based organizations could still 
be held accountable for the quality and 
costs associated with hospitalization.
Consistent with the call for flexibility, 
hospitals or hospital systems (ODSs or 
IDSs) might also be allowed to lead an 
ACO. In many communities, hospitals 
employ a large portion of the physician 
workforce and they may be more likely 
to provide capital and management skills 
that ACOs would require to produce 
the kind of system redesign needed 
to methodically improve quality and 
reduce wasteful care in accord with a 
spending budget. 
Indeed, to address the problem of 
care fragmentation, some think that 
local hospitals must be included in 
an ACO. However, others think that 
the relationship between physicians 
and hospitals is becoming so severely 
strained18 that perhaps we should allow 
separate outpatient and inpatient ACOs 
to develop and not force a marriage 
between feuding partners. While 
the latter approach might defeat one 
of the primary purposes of ACOs—
accountability for the full continuum 
of care—it may be more feasible in 
the short term and potentially allow 
separate ACOs to come together in  
the future.19 
Similarly, some would want other 
provider types, such as post acute 
care facilities and ambulatory surgery 
centers, to be part of broad ACOs. In 
contrast, others would not require their 
inclusion but would want to hold the 
ACO accountable for the care—and 
costs—provided across the range of 
services beneficiaries might need. 
The ACO definition and accompanying 
qualifying criteria delineated in final 
legislation or demonstration guidance 
would strongly influence, if not actually 
determine, what types of organizations 
would lead or participate in an ACO 
and how they would have to be legally 
structured. For example, if an ACO were 
defined as a physician-led organization 
and the minimum number of physicians 
needed set at 200 or more, as in the PGP 
demonstration, only a relatively small 
number of existing physician groups, 
mostly MSGs, would be able to meet the 
criteria. Smaller groups would either 
have to merge or, more likely, would 
have to form an IPA to participate. Yet, 
again, the current interest in ACOs arose 
from a desire to permit even virtual 
organizations of physicians working in 
close proximity and serving the same 
patients to become ACOs and thus 
permit looser organizations to constitute 
eligible ACOs. 
Some recommend that even very small 
physician groups, such as those with 
three to five physicians, should be 
allowed to serve as ACOs; the Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman’s Mark 
also adopts this view.20 However, this 
approach raises concerns about small 
practices’ ability to fulfill the three 
key ACO characteristics described in 
the introduction and would create a 
much greater administrative burden for 
the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) than a program relying 
on a smaller number of larger physician 
groups, IPAs, or provider organizations. 
Indeed, it is not clear how the 
expectations for an ACO with a few 
physicians differ conceptually from 
a PCMH, and to what extent ACOs 
and PCMH programs complement or 
conflict with each other. The PCMH 
is an enhanced primary care practice 
model that provides comprehensive 
and timely care with appropriate 
reimbursement, emphasizing the 
central role of teamwork by a group 
of health professionals and more 
active engagement by those receiving 
care. The PCMH concept not only 
emphasizes enhanced primary care but 
also incorporates the ideas of provider 
payment and delivery system reforms, 
including primary care providers’ 
voluntary acceptance of accountability 
for the quality of care provided to their 
patients.21 Some believe that ACOs and 
PCMHs are complementary innovations 
and discuss ways they could be mutually 
beneficial and reinforcing.22, 23
Voluntary or mandatory provider 
participation 
The House bill proposes a voluntary 
ACO provider program24 and MedPAC 
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describes this approach as well.25 That 
is, an existing provider organization or 
new configurations of them (see figure 
1 and table 1) would have to indicate 
proactively a desire to participate. If the 
traditional Medicare program adopts 
policies that strictly limit provider 
payment increases, physicians (with or 
without hospital partners) might want 
to opt out of the payment constrained 
FFS program by selecting the alternative 
ACO pathway that offers them the 
potential of both expanding their 
patient base and achieving financial 
rewards based on their own actual 
performance. Another reason physicians 
might voluntarily want to become an 
ACO is that some physicians do not like 
the incentives inherent in standard FFS 
payments and would like to be rewarded 
for achieving high standards on quality 
measurement and prudent management 
of health resources, which should 
include building stronger partnerships 
with patients. In short, physicians and 
other providers might be both pushed 
and pulled into an ACO program 
offered by the nation’s largest and most 
important payer—Medicare.
A voluntary provider program has 
several potential strengths. First, 
provider organizations that are able to 
meet the accountability tests would 
choose to participate, increasing 
the likelihood of initial ACO success 
and providing models for others to 
emulate. Second, a narrower, voluntary 
participation program would require 
fewer resources to administer and 
oversee initially. 
However, relying on voluntary 
participation might result in relatively 
little uptake, as occurred with the 
PSO program. An initiative that 
is small in scale and involving a 
unique set of providers might not be 
particularly relevant to the challenge of 
fundamentally restructuring payment 
and practice across the country. In 
addition, only organizations that feel 
confident they would earn bonuses 
might choose to participate, raising 
concerns that a voluntary ACO program 
overall would not generate savings for 
Medicare.26 
Alternatively, in a mandatory provider 
program, physicians and hospitals 
would be assigned to a virtual ACO 
based on analysis of claims data; 
currently, provider organizations 
and professionals generally do not 
know how frequently their patients 
are flowing to each other’s practices 
and institutions and may not perceive 
themselves as having a common interest 
in caring for these patients. Plausibly, 
their assignment into the same virtual 
organization would provide them with 
this key information and a reason to 
develop their relationships, a culture of 
collective responsibility, and an effective 
governance structure. 
Accordingly, there are several 
positive attributes of a mandatory 
ACO program. First, it can be much 
more widely applied than a voluntary 
program because it should engage 
most physicians, hospitals, and perhaps 
other key providers that serve Medicare 
beneficiaries and would provide them a 
reason to work together. Because of its 
much broader application, a mandatory 
program could result in greater 
Medicare savings27—but only if the 
selected payment model in fact succeeds 
in achieving spending reductions. 
On the other hand, a broad program 
of assigning beneficiaries, physicians, 
and other providers to statistically 
determined ACOs would be challenging 
to administer. In addition, some 
providers would be reluctant or 
unprepared to alter their practice 
patterns to reduce cost and improve 
quality. Merely providing them a mild 
financial incentive to change their 
practice patterns would not guarantee 
that they would actually change. In 
addition, the physicians assigned to 
the ACO would need to develop a 
common vision of how to achieve 
their organizational objectives and 
would have to implement a functional 
governance structure. Some doubt 
that these ACO prerequisites would be 
accomplished in many cases. Indeed, 
imposing a requirement that key health 
care providers participate together in 
an ACO might only exacerbate conflicts 
between health care organizations 
and professionals that have developed 
over the years, such as those between 
physicians and hospitals and between 
primary care physicians and specialists. 
How beneficiaries participate  
in ACOs
Beneficiaries’ reactions to the ACO 
concept will also be important, because 
their perceptions would affect whether 
they will ultimately select ACOs if given 
an opportunity or whether they will 
support or oppose them in other ways, 
such as a through political activity; 
further, their responses could affect 
providers’ ability to improve their cost 
and quality performance. For example, 
if beneficiaries believe that ACOs are 
essentially tightly managed “HMOs in 
drag” that are going to restrict their 
choices, undermine the doctor-patient 
relationship, and result in cheaper but 
lower-quality care, the concept will 
be met with skepticism, if not overt 
opposition. On the other hand, if ACOs 
are viewed as a way to make the health 
care system easier to navigate and to 
improve the quality of care, to provide 
more for their health care dollars, and 
to put critical health care decisions in 
the hands of local doctors, hospitals, 
and the communities and patients they 
serve, the concept is likely to be more 
positively received. Whether and how 
CMS and providers communicate with 
beneficiaries about these ACO-related 
issues will influence their response to 
the innovation, as will two important 
ACO program features: (1) whether they 
are assigned to an ACO or, alternatively, 
are allowed to select participation in 
an ACO; and (2) whether and to what 
degree their access to care outside an 
ACO is restricted in any way. 
In some ACO proposals, beneficiaries 
would be assigned to an ACO based 
on where claims analysis shows they 
go for their care; adopting the PGP 
demonstration approach, they might 
not even have to be informed of this 
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assignment because their freedom 
of provider choice would not be 
restricted in any way. In this case, ACO 
assignment is coupled with a “no lock-
in” feature. Although providers would 
be managing their care, beneficiaries 
would not necessarily even know it. 
Indeed, if beneficiaries’ care patterns 
change from one year to the next, their 
ACO assignments would likely change 
accordingly. There is a slight difference 
on this issue between the House 
Tri-Committee’s and Senate Finance 
Committee’s proposals, with both 
proposing beneficiary assignment but 
the House requiring that beneficiaries 
must be informed of that assignment 
and the Senate not stipulating that 
beneficiaries have to be informed.
Beneficiaries may view claims-based 
assignment and no lock-in positively, 
because it does not interfere with 
their choices or existing doctor-patient 
relationships; further, these features 
would simplify the administration 
of an ACO program. On the other 
hand, if beneficiaries indirectly and 
retrospectively learn that their provider 
had an incentive to reduce cost and 
improve quality, it might undermine 
trust in their physicians, as some 
contend that HMOs and managed care 
potentially does.28 In addition, this no 
lock-in feature might negatively affect 
ACOs’ interest in actually managing 
patients’ care and their ability to actually 
do so, making it harder to determine 
which patients and care management 
processes to focus on to achieve cost 
and quality targets. 
An alternative is to require beneficiaries 
to affirmatively select an ACO if one 
exists in the community, much as 
patients select an HMO network, and to 
commit to seeking their care from ACO 
providers for some set time. This option 
would require more extensive efforts 
to help beneficiaries and consumers 
understand what ACOs are and the 
respective roles and responsibilities that 
pertain. The mere process of facilitating 
beneficiary selection of ACOs would be 
administratively much more complex 
than a statistically based assignment. 
This approach might invoke the need  
for additional regulatory oversight if 
ACOs wanted to use techniques to 
manage care similar to those used by 
HMOs and the rare PSOs in the Medicare 
Advantage program. 
Because of the concern that a true 
lock-in would discourage beneficiary 
participation in what would likely be 
restricted ACO provider networks, 
variants of what might be called a soft 
lock-in have been suggested for ACOs 
where beneficiaries make an affirmative 
decision to associate with a particular 
ACO. A soft lock-in might involve 
financial incentives, such as differential 
cost sharing, to encourage beneficiaries 
to seek care mostly from the ACO they 
have selected, an approach used in 
preferred provider organizations and 
point-of-service plans. A soft lock-in 
might even be as simple as a good faith 
social contract between beneficiaries 
and the ACO, outlining the parties’ 
responsibilities to each other but 
otherwise not restricting freedom  
of choice. 
Provider payment methods and 
financial incentives
While a number of payment models 
to support ACOs are possible, two 
very different types of ACO payment 
methods are included in the current 
House legislative proposals for testing: a 
shared savings program (SSP) and partial 
capitation, based on what some call 
population-based payment (PBP).29 
The basic SSP concept is fairly 
straightforward and illustrated in figure 
2. The FFS system remains intact, so 
providers continue to be paid on that 
basis. However, Medicare calculates and 
sets the expected total expenditures for 
the patients cared for by the ACO while 
measuring and assessing the quality of 
care. If the ACO provides the care its 
patients need for less than expected and 
the quality standards are met, the ACO is 
rewarded with a portion of the savings 
as a bonus. A variant of the SSP is that 
some portion of billed for FFS payments 
are withheld and only returned if the 
ACO provides the care its patients need 
for less than expected.30 
Figure 2.  Shared Saving Program (SSP)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
High Spending Area
Projected Spending
Low Spending Area
ACO Program 
Launch
Actual Spending
Actual Spending
Actual Spending
Savings
Savings*
Savings
H
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lth
 C
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e 
S
p
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d
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g
*How any savings would be shared (e.g., 80/20, 50/50, 40/60) by payers and providers has yet to be determined.
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A critical issue with the SSP payment 
method is how to calculate and set the 
expected total expenditures for patients 
cared for by the ACO. While the PGP 
demonstration used a control group as 
the source of expected expenditures, 
setting up a control group for every ACO 
would not be administratively feasible, 
particularly for a large-scale program. 
As an alternative, MedPAC proposes 
determining expected total costs and 
setting benchmarks based on historical 
spending over a three-year period, 
adjusted for patient case mix. Yet, even 
here, there are options that vary on two 
dimensions: (1) use of local, regional, 
or national spending; and (2) a focus 
on base spending, the rate of spending 
growth, or some combination of the 
two. Different configurations for setting 
spending targets would importantly 
determine the likelihood that any 
particular ACO would in fact achieve 
bonuses based on the success of their 
spending management.31
Whatever variant of the SSP payment 
options are selected, the anticipated 
virtue of determining bonuses based 
on a shared savings approach is that it 
does not involve financial risk taking, 
making it more attractive to many 
would-be ACOs. In addition, SSP should 
be relatively easy to implement, since 
the basic FFS payment system remains in 
place, with determination of bonuses a 
retrospective accounting matter. 
However, there may be a fundamental 
weakness to the SSP payment method 
for ACOs—it leaves the “do more, get 
paid more” incentives of FFS in place. 
New services or care management 
approaches that might reduce total 
expenditures but are not paid for under 
FFS system, such as greater reliance 
on nurse care managers for chronic 
care patients and enhanced patient 
communication outside of standard 
office visits by phone or e-mail, may 
go untried. Otherwise, the ACO would 
have to finance these activities directly, 
with uncertain prospects of financial 
rewards for so doing. It is also hard to 
see how the prospect of a potential 
bonus sometime in the future would 
counter the real-time FFS incentive to 
generate more services. The speculative 
nature of a potential bonus may be too 
weak to motivate an ACO to commit 
to innovate, perform well, and sustain 
gains. Although acknowledging that FFS 
incentives are a problem, proponents 
of this approach nevertheless believe 
that the prospects of a substantial bonus 
based on achieving overall savings could 
produce different referral patterns 
within the ACO such that more care 
would be channeled to the clinicians 
who demonstrate more prudent use of 
health care resources. 
In addition, a SSP based on local 
spending primarily rewards 
improvement rather than good 
performance. Communities and 
providers that have the most to gain 
from an SSP are the ones seemingly 
wasting the most resources (see figure 
2). Those that are already doing well by 
being low cost and high quality would 
have to make greater investments to 
improve and would be less likely to 
be rewarded (see figure 2). Indeed, 
since current SSP models provide no 
downside risk or penalty to the provider 
for missing both quality and cost targets, 
ACOs and affiliated providers would 
have a perverse incentive to increase 
utilization and total costs in order to 
create future opportunities for “savings” 
and “bonuses.”32
The alternative to SSP specified in the 
House legislation is partial capitation or 
a PBP system, where a predetermined 
amount is prepaid to a provider for the 
services needed by a specific group of 
people for a fixed period. Capitation 
or PBP payment methods encourages 
providers to think in terms of the 
resources required to take care of the 
overall population they are accountable 
for and involves a greater degree of 
financial risk for them which is typically 
greater than any type of SSP with a 
withhold. More specifically, capitation 
prepayments are calculated on a per 
person, per month—per capita—basis. 
Historically, financial risk taking by 
providers raised complex insurance 
regulation issues, and there have been 
numerous problems with capitated 
payment approaches. Capitation 
payments to providers generally were 
not risk-adjusted for patient health 
status; capitation payment amounts 
were sometimes driven down to levels 
providers found inadequate to support 
needed care; in some contracting 
situations, no provisions were made 
for costly cases, which could deplete 
the capitation funds.33 Providers also 
executed poorly in many cases because 
they lacked both administrative and 
clinical infrastructures needed to 
effectively manage the amount of 
financial risk they were assuming.34 
Imposed administrative requirements 
undermined the theoretical simplicity of 
making a single monthly payment rather 
than paying claims for each service 
rendered. For example, physicians often 
still had to submit “shadow” claims as if 
they were real. Lastly, when capitation 
was more widely used in the 1980s and 
1990s, there was less measurement 
and reporting of quality information, 
leading to a public perception that the 
financial incentives may have resulted in 
providers’ stinting on care. 
Proponents of retesting capitation hope 
that these problems with capitation can 
be overcome and that ACOs offer a more 
promising programmatic vehicle for 
direct contracting with Medicare than 
the failed PSO approach.35 They note 
MSGs, IPAs, and other organizations’ 
success in managing capitation in 
California and elsewhere, and so think 
that providers with more experience 
and improved infrastructure are more 
capable of managing financial risk than 
a decade ago when the PSO experiment 
fizzled. With payments based on 
improved risk-adjustment tools, ACOs, 
which could well have sicker than 
average patients if they recruit from 
their own patient rosters, would not be 
disadvantaged as would have been the 
case in the 1990s. 
An important variation on the BBA-
PSO capitation approach would be the 
introduction of risk and profit sharing, 
rather than full-risk contracting to 
ACOs—that is, partial rather than full 
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capitation. A model here is the Medicare 
Prescription Drug Program (PDP) 
established by the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003, in which risk corridors 
were set up to limit a prescription drug 
plan’s potential losses should  the plan 
happen to experience much higher 
utilization and costs than expected.36 
It could be that with Medicare directly 
sharing risk under a population-based 
payment approach, providers would 
be more likely to participate. And with 
Medicare’s “deep pockets”, public policy 
concerns about provider financial 
solvency would be mitigated. 
If properly designed, partial 
capitation might have a number 
of theoretical advantages over the 
SSP payment method. First, ACOs 
and affiliated providers would have 
greater incentives and the flexibility 
to deploy newer services and care 
management approaches that are 
not currently covered or paid for 
in the FFS system. Second, ACOs 
would receive funds upfront and on a 
regular basis, facilitating capital and 
other investments. Third, and most 
importantly, the nature of the payment 
provides fundamentally different 
payment incentives. For example, under 
an SSP hospitals remain primarily an 
accounting “profit center” for an ACO; 
under a capitated, population-based 
payment model, the hospital essentially 
becomes a “cost center.” Further, the 
ACO would have an incentive not only to 
reduce total costs but also to sustain the 
improvements over time. Yet, because 
the ACO must meet the quality targets 
before they are eligible for retaining 
their savings, Medicare beneficiaries 
would have some protection against 
ACOs stinting on care. 
If using capitation, the difficult issues 
that have caused controversy in 
determining Medicare Advantage–
capitated payments would also arise 
in determining capitation amounts for 
ACOs. Would capitation amounts be 
based on spending in the local area, 
be ACO specific, or reflect national 
norms? What would be the basis for 
determining annual increases? Aside 
from these technical issues related 
to determining ACO payments, the 
fundamental question is whether there 
are enough physicians interested in 
doing the hard work of forming and 
managing ACOs capable of directly 
managing even partial capitation risk. It 
is possible that for all of the theoretical 
advantages of this approach, there 
would be few takers in a voluntary ACO 
program using any form of capitation
Accountability for quality
As already emphasized, whichever 
payment model is adopted, the financial 
benefits of achieving cost targets are 
contingent on quality.37 Thus, another 
important issue is how quality will 
be assessed and what level of quality 
performance or improvement will 
be required. ACO proponents are 
concerned that without a serious quality 
assessment and reporting component, 
ACOs might emphasize cost cutting 
rather than improved value. MedPAC 
suggests that “quality measures and 
targets could be aggregated into 
a weighted quality score.”38 CMS 
could begin with a limited set of 
existing and appropriate risk-adjusted 
quality measures, improvements 
in infrastructure that support 
quality-improvement efforts such as 
“meaningful use” of electronic health 
records, and potentially incorporate  
and align ACO measures with those  
used in the PCMH demonstration. 
Additional quality measures could be 
added to over time. 
There also are benefits of applying 
quality measures at the ACO level, rather 
than the individual clinician or facility 
level. First, measures that capture issues 
in care coordination across different 
providers could appropriately be 
applied to ACOs. Second, aggregation 
to the ACO level provides adequate 
numbers to assure a level of statistical 
validity that is lacking when applied to 
individual clinicians. Finally, theory —
and some empirical data—support the 
notion that some larger organizations 
are better able to mount and sustain 
quality-improvement activities than 
smaller organizations or individual 
health professionals, who are typically 
consumed with the day-to-day pressures 
of clinical practice. 
Implementation challenges 
Implementation is always challenging, 
and decisions about the ACO program 
features discussed will have a substantial 
impact on the implementation 
process. However, there are some core 
implementation issues that will need 
to be addressed, regardless of the ACO 
program specifics.
Participation of, and impact on, 
other public and private payers
If ACOs provide desirable delivery 
system enhancements for Medicare, 
we would hope and possibly expect 
that they would also be desirable for 
other payers as well. In fact, some 
recommend that self-funded employers 
and commercial insurers should follow 
Medicare’s lead or collaborate with 
them on an ACO program initiative. 
Massachusetts is considering ACOs as 
way to control health care spending as 
part of the state’s continued evolution 
of comprehensive health reform.39 
Arguably, such payer collaboration 
would align and strengthen providers’ 
financial incentives and avoid conflicting 
program features and additional 
administrative burden. 
However, an ACO program designed 
for traditional Medicare beneficiaries, 
particularly a mandated program based 
on analysis of Medicare claims data as 
some proposals call for, might not serve 
private employers’ or health plans’ 
interests very well. The pattern of care 
for employee or health plan enrollees 
might be quite different from that 
of Medicare beneficiaries, reflecting 
referral patterns characteristic of plan-
specific provider networks. 
Perhaps even more serious, purchasers 
and plans are concerned that 
sanctioning the collaboration of most 
of the physicians with each other, 
perhaps also with one or more hospitals 
in a geographic area, would increase 
providers’ market power and result 
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in substantially increased provider 
prices gained through negotiated 
contracts, costing the payers much 
more than if the providers remained 
in their fragmented silos. In short, 
newly empowered ACOs might be well 
positioned to reduce spending and 
spending growth for Medicare, but not 
for commercial insurers and self-funded 
employers; providers might be able to 
demand higher payments from private 
payers even as their own costs go down. 
Further, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
might actually want to prohibit for 
antitrust reasons certain ACO entities 
that Medicare might want to promote 
(e.g., loosely affiliated physicians and 
hospitals constituting an ACO under 
a share saving payment model).40 To 
date, whether and how ACOs would 
be allowed to operate in relation to 
commercial payers, including a possible 
role for public regulation of private 
sector prices, have not been explored 
but likely must be before the ACO 
concept goes very far. 
New roles and responsibilities for 
providers and government agencies
Clearly, the ACO concept poses a variety 
of implementation challenges for health 
care providers and federal government 
officials. In a new provider payment and 
delivery system environment—a much 
more value-focused system—each party 
would have to change and take on new 
roles and responsibilities. 
To be successful in an ACO program, 
providers would need to utilize and 
strengthen a variety of organizational, 
technical, and clinical skills over time. 
Some would describe the nature of 
needed provider changes as truly 
transformational. Even providers with 
greater experience with the kinds 
of payment methods and programs 
discussed find that it takes time and 
capacity building in key areas, such 
as cultural change, managerial and 
physician leadership, teamwork, health 
information technology, and care 
management process redesign and 
improvement.41
Prior experience in health care, as well 
as other industries, provides practical 
approaches and lessons for helping 
providers get started and successfully 
move forward. For example, technical 
assistance, quality-improvement 
collaboratives, coaching, and sharing 
of key resources, information, and tools 
are likely to be helpful to providers 
participating in an ACO program. 
Provider professional associations and 
consulting firms may provide these 
kinds of support and assistance to 
ACOs, but there is potentially a very 
important role here for Medicare Quality 
Improvement Organizations (QIO) and 
other public entities as well. 
Federal officials would also need 
to make changes and develop new 
capacities to administer an ACO 
program, and the more providers and 
beneficiaries involved, the more difficult 
these changes are to make. In addition 
to supporting and assisting providers, 
there are a range of complementary 
policies that would have to be reviewed 
and probably altered to permit ACOs 
to form and succeed. Some include 
antitrust enforcement, “gainsharing” 
(profit sharing between hospitals and 
physicians), state-based insurance 
regulation, and issues related to 
professional and organizational liability. 
Finally, depending on which ACO 
approaches are being tested, there 
might need to be extensive education of 
beneficiaries about their opportunities, 
responsibilities, and rights. 
All of these activities would require 
time and expertise. They are much 
more complex and resource intensive 
than current administrative payment 
methods, which essentially require 
uniform application of national 
payment formulas. Therefore, to 
embark down the road of even broad 
pilots and demonstrations of ACOs, 
Congress would need to assure that 
CMS would receive adequate resources 
for supporting the demonstrations 
and assuring adequate evaluation and 
midcourse corrections. 
Skeptics arise
Some experienced hands counsel that 
ACOs are a bad idea—that Congress 
should not embark down this road at 
all. In the words of Jeff Goldsmith, a 
health care consultant who helped 
put together prior versions of ACOs 
more than a decade ago, “The problem 
with this movie is that we’ve actually 
seen it before and it was a colossal and 
expensive failure.”42 That experience 
was related to risk-bearing provider 
organizations, which imposed 
restrictions on patients’ freedom of 
choice. He not only points to the serious 
problems of execution that plagued 
these organizations but even more 
fundamentally challenges the concept 
itself in concluding that employers and 
patients preferred open panels managed 
by health insurers to closed panels 
managed by providers.
Goldsmith is no less sparing in his 
criticism of the ACO model that is 
receiving the most attention now—the 
shared saving payment approach that 
does not restrict patient choice or 
require any providers to take financial 
risks. He points to the fact that in 
many medical markets, the physician 
community has drawn away from the 
hospital and functions increasingly 
independently on a day-to-day basis. 
The weak financial incentives in the SSP 
payment model, he asserts, would not be 
able to bring together these increasingly 
independent professionals, who have 
interest in preserving the status quo, not 
participating in substantial collective 
efforts for nominal shared savings.
Conclusion 
There is broad policy agreement on, and 
an evidence base regarding, the need for 
provider payment and delivery system 
reforms that create financial incentives 
for providers to work together to bend 
the cost curve and improve quality. 
The ACO proposals are one of the few 
serious attempts to move ahead to 
achieve these objectives. 
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However, there are quite different 
interpretations of the current ACO 
concept and its predecessors. One view 
is that the ideas are fundamentally 
flawed and that the conditions are not 
right for changes of this kind, and may 
have even gotten worse since the mid-
1980s and 1990s. Another perspective 
is that the flaws with the concept have 
or could be overcome, and that some 
conditions have not only improved, but 
also can be positively affected by the 
policy decisions made moving ahead. 
ACOs will not be a real game changer 
in the short run but are definitely 
worth a concerted try, given long-
standing problems with the FFS 
provider payment and delivery systems 
that impede health care cost control 
and quality improvement. ACOs can 
help overcome the impasse of where 
to start first—provider payment or 
delivery system reform—by coupling 
and coevolving them over time. ACO 
proposals also offer the opportunity 
to harness the tremendous purchasing 
power of the traditional Medicare 
program, potentially creating a much 
greater incentive for providers to begin 
assuming real accountability and making 
necessary improvements. In addition, 
the ACO concept may avoid a one-size-
fits-all provider payment or delivery 
system reform approach, which is 
unlikely to work given the variation in 
local markets and provider organizations 
and their capabilities. Lastly, ACOs 
can potentially complement other 
reform initiatives, including the patient-
centered medical home, meaningful 
use of electronic medical records, and 
comparative effectiveness research.
Nevertheless, there still are very 
challenging implementation issues that 
need to be recognized and addressed. 
In order for ACOs to be a real game 
changer in the long run, the concept 
needs to move past the rosy-scenario 
phase that has become common for 
energetically endorsed new or reprised 
concepts and now confront the many 
evident challenges. Lessons from previous 
experiences and ongoing demonstrations 
can help identify potential solutions to 
the complex financial, organizational, 
legal and regulatory issues, and provide 
insight into the trade-offs between 
various program proposals and options. 
In addition, the ability to learn from the 
early ACO efforts and to make program 
modifications as necessary will be critical, 
as it is unreasonable to expect substantial 
changes to occur without some problems 
or failures or in the short run.
In sum, there is a ripe opportunity 
for policymakers and providers to get 
critical provider payment and delivery 
system reform processes underway, 
potentially moving us into a new era 
in which local physicians and provider 
organizations have not only the 
accountability but authority, financial 
incentives, and capacity to redesign the 
delivery system to add greater value. 
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